• June 5th/6th US 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division are parachuted into the area surrounding Ste Mere Eglise.
• June 6th - D-Day landings
• June 25th - 29th Operation Epsom, an offensive to the west of Caen, repulsed by the German defenders.
• July 7th - Caen finally captured.
• July 17th - Erwin Rommel severely injured when his car was strafed by an Allied aircraft.
• July 18th - 20th - Operation Goodwood initiated.
• August 3rd - 9th - Operation Totalize, a trap to capture retreating German armour starts.
• August 16th Operation Dragoon, a joint American/French landing on the French Riviera, begins.

The toehold that the allies established at Normandy was vital for Britain and the U.S. to bring the war to Germany's front door. It could be debated that the Soviets alone were sufficient to crush Germany by this point, and that this battle was unnecessary for the purpose of defeating the German Reich. By the time D-Day happened, the Red Army was steadily advancing towards Germany and about 3/4s of the German forces were in the East. The US and British only faced about a quarter of the German army in France. Yet given the Soviet's claim over Eastern Europe, one could ask if the result would have been a complete occupation of Europe by communist forces. American and British presence helped define the extent that communism would spread, and ensure that democracy would be safe in western europe. Thus the battle of Normandy needs to be understood both within the context of WWII and in that of the Cold War that would follow.

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On July 1 the German-Italian Afrika Korps led by Erwin Rommel attacked. The Allied line near El Alamein was not overrun until the evening and this hold up stalled the Axis advance.

The operation was successful up to the capture of the Rhine bridge at Nijmegen, but is generally considered a failure as the final bridge at Arnhem was not held, resulting in the destruction of the British 1st Airborne division.

Background

After the breakout from the Normandy beachheads in August, the Allied forces had pushed back the German army hundreds of miles over a period of only a few weeks. By the end of August enough Allied troops were on land to form several armies. To the east, on the right, the US had two complete armies, the 1st under Hodges and the 3rd under Patton, in a line running north-south near the German frontier. To their left the British 2nd Army under Bernard Montgomery held the north-east corner in a line running from Antwerp to the US lines roughly along the northern border of Belgium. On their left, on the Atlantic coast, was the Canadian 1st army who had recently advanced to a line just south of the British.

At this point the offensive halted as supplies ran low. The only source of supplies in Allied hands were the shallow docks built on the original invasion beaches, and the nearby deep-water port of Cherbourg at the tip of the Cotentin. Both of these were of limited use, as the D-Day pre-invasion "softening up" air strikes had effectively destroyed all rail transportation in the area. The massive port of Antwerp lay in British hands, but the river estuary leading inland to this port (the Westerschelde) in front of the Canadians was still in German control.

Clearly the primary concern for the Allies should have been the advance of the Canadian army to remove the remaining German forces from the area and open Antwerp. However the Canadians had little "pull" compared to the two prima-donna generals, Patton and Montgomery. Both consistantly asked for all available supplies to be given to them for quick advances, but Eisenhower refused, and maintained a strategy of broad attack across the entire front. As the offensive faltered both Montgomery and Patton argued anew for thrusting attacks, and Eisenhower eventually asked both for their plans.

Patton favoured an attack east from his current positions to take the city of Metz, and then into the industrial area of the Saar. However this required passing the Seigfried Line of defenses at the German border, and left them in front of the equally heavily defended Rhine. As a defensive manuver it was an excellent plan, as it would leave the Allies in control of the easily defended west bank of the Rhine. But as an offensive plan it did little other than take more land, and left them in an only slightly better position to assult Germany.

Montgomery instead suggested an attack north to Arnhem, deep inside the Netherlands, which would bypass the Seigfried Line (which stopped about 20km south of there), cross the Rhine, and capture the entire German 15th army behind their lines between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer. This would also have the side effect of cutting off the V-2 launch sites, which were bombarding London at this time.

Eisenhower continued to dither, as he was most interested in the opening of Antwerp to supplies. Montgomery pointed out that there were already enough supplies in the field if he would be given those of Patton's army. His plan also ringed the entire Antwerp area well behind Allied lines, allowing it to be easily opened once the attack was completed.

The final straw was the addition of the newly-formed 1st Allied Airborne Army into the mix. This consisted of three US and two British airborne divisions, and an additional Polish brigade, which had formed up in England after the the removal of the airborne forces from France after the Normandy breakout. Eisenhower had been under intense pressure from the US to use these forces as soon as possible, so Montgomery changed his plan to use the 1st to capture three important bridges, opening the entire attack route to a very rapid advance by the 2nd Army.

The Plan

The plan of action consisted of two coordinated operations, Market which was the use of the airborne troops, and Garden consisting of the British 2nd Army moving north along highway 69, spearheaded by 30 Corp.

Market would employ three of the five divisions of the 1st Airborne army. The US 101st Airborne Division would drop in two locations just north of the 30 Corp to take the bridges northwest of Eindhoven at Son and Veghel. The 82nd Airborne Division would drop quite a bit northeast of them to take the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen, and finally the British 1st would drop at the extreme north end of the route, to take the road and rail bridges at Arnhem.

Market would be the largest airborne operation in history, delivering the 101st, 82nd, 1st and the Polish Airborne brigade in a series of three huge operations known as "lifts". Commander of the 1st Army, Browning, then added his own HQ to the first lift so that he could command from the front.

Garden consisted primarly of 30 Corp., the core of the 2nd Army. They were expected to arrive at the south end of the 101st's area on the launch day, the 82nd by the second day, and the 1st by the third or fourth day at the latest. They would also deliver several additional infantry divisions to take over the defensive operations from the airborne, freeing them for other operations as soon as possible.

Still, four days is a long time for an airborne force to fight unsupplied, and they are lightly armed to start with. But it seemed that the German resistance at this point was even lighter. Most of the German 15th Army in the area appeared to be fleeing the field from in front of the Canadians, and they were known to have no Panzer gruppen. 30 Corp would therefore be facing very limited resistance on their route up highway 69, and little armor. Meanwhile the German defenders would be spread out over 100km trying to contain the pockets of airborne forces, from the British 2nd Army in the south, to Arnhem in the north.

All was not what it seemed. In fact the rout of 15th army had largely ended by this point, and most of the men had escaped out from the pocket between the Canadian 1st and the Westerschelde, adding 80,000 men to the area just to the northwest of the attack route. Much more alarming was the withdrawal of the 9SS and 10SS Panzer divisions from the 17th Army in front of Patton, to rest and refit in the rear. A suitable quiet spot was selected, which happened to be Arnhem. This meant another 9,000 troops in the area, all of them elite armored forces with heavy weapons.

Several reports started leaking out from the Netherlands reporting on both of these facts, but by this time the planning was in late stages and the reports were basically ignored. When a recce flight was sent in on behalf of the 1st Airborne Army, it returned with pictures clearly showing tanks deployed just to the northeast of Arnhem, perhaps only 15km from where the British would be dropping. These were dismissed out of hand, with the claim that they probably couldn't run and were broken down.

Worse, RAF Transport Command reported that they were desperately short of aircraft and would be barely able to support the operation. Any losses or bad weather would upset this ability. The problem was so accute that they flatly refused to drop the British to the north of their target bridge because it would put them in range of flak guns just to the north at Deelen. Another suitable drop zone just to the south of the bridge was also rejected because it was thought to be marshy, and thus unsuitable for dropping the gliders containing the force's heavier equipment. Instead they demanded a drop zone 15km away from the bridge, which would have to be taken and held overnight until the 3rd lift — the force would have to be split in half for over a day.

Realizing the seriousness of the problem, the plan was then hastily changed to add a small force of machine-gun equipped Land Rovers to the first lift. These would race forward from the drop zone to the bridge as soon as possible, holding it until the infantry could arrive. Three brigades would follow on foot, with the fourth and all the glider pilots holding the drop zones while they waited for the next two lifts.

In a staggeringly short period of one week, everything was ready.

The Battle

Day 1, Sunday September 17, 1944

Operation Market/Garden opened with successes all around. The first lift was in daylight for accuracy, and almost all of the troops arrived on top of their target drop zones without incident. This contrasted strongly with previous operations where night drops resulted in the units being scattered by up to 20km in some cases.

In the south the 101st met little resistance and easily captured the small bridge at Veghel. However the similar bridge at Son was blown up as they approached it, after being delayed by a short engagement with German anti-tank guns. Later that day several small attacks by units of the 15th Army were beat off, while small units of the 101st had moved south of Son.

To their north the 82nd arrived, and the small group dropped near Grave took the bridge intact in a rush. However the main force of the 82nd found their task of securing the high ground to the east of Nijmegen much harder than they expected, and they continued to try for the rest of the day. One force tasked with taking the bridge made their attempt, but due to miscommunication they didn't start until late in the day and never made it. This left the Nijmegen bridge in German hands.

Meanwhile the 1st Airborne landed almost without a hitch, with the exception that the Land Rover force lost over half its vehicles on landing, and the rest were ambushed on their way into Arnhem. Thus the only hope of capturing the bridge was on foot.

This too proved very difficult. Two of the three brigades found themselves slowed down by small German units of a training battalion rushing to hem them in. Luckily one of the three, led by Col. Frost, found their route largely undefended, and arrived at the bridge in the afternoon and set up defensive positions. Continued attempts by the other two were meeting increased resistance, so eventually the decision was made to wait for the second lift and try again tomorrow.

This is of vital importance. Unlike any of the bridges to the south, which were over smaller rivers and canals and could be bridged by engineering units, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the Rhine, and there was no possibility of bridging either. To make matters worse, the British airborne were on the far side of their bridge. If either Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not captured and held, there was absolutely no way for 30 Corp to reach them. Yet at the end of Day 1, only a small force held Arnhem, and Nijmegen was German.

To makes matters worse, the British radios didn't work. Their long-range VFH sets were delivered with the wrong crystals, thus operating on a frequency no-one was listening to. Meanwhile the shorter range sets for use between the brigades didn't work for no obvious reason (at the time) and the various brigades were completely cut off from each other.

30 Corp didn't start their advance until 2pm, although the reasons for this planned delay are unclear. Soon after starting they ran into a force of anti-tank units dug in on the road, and it took several hours for them to be cleared, along with the loss of several of the elite Guards Armored's tanks. By the time the light started giving out at 5pm they were still 15km south of Eindhoven. The operation was already behind schedule.

On the German side things were not much better, largely because it wasn't clear at the start what was going on. Model, in direct command of the forces in the area, was completely confused by the British dropping in what appeared to be the middle of nowhere, and concluded they were commandos attempting to kidnap him. Meanwhile Bittrich, commander of the 9th and 10th (collectively the 2nd SS Panzer Corp), had a clearer head and immediately sent a recce squadron of the 9th to Nijmegen to reinforce the bridge defense there.

Day 2, Monday the 18th

Early in the day the force of the 9th Panzer sent south the day before concluded they were not needed in Nijmegen, and attempted to return to Arnhem. They were aware of the British troops at the bridge, but attempted to cross by force anyway and were beaten back with staggering losses. Meanwhile the attempt to move the other two British brigades into the bridge area were both easily beat off by the newly arrived forces of the 10th SS. Lift two arrived late due to fog in England, but put down successfully in the afternoon.

To their south the 82nd was having troubles of its own. Grave was well protected, but German forces contined to press on the 82nd deployed to the east of Nijmegen. In the morning they took one of their landing zones, target for the second lift which was to arrive at 1pm. Troops from the entire area, even as far as the town itself, rushed to the drop zone and by 3pm it was back in their control. Due to the delay in England the second lift didn't arrive until 3:30.

The 101st, faced with the loss of the bridge at Son, attempted to take the similar bridge a few kilometers away at Best. However they found their approach heavily blocked, and eventually gave up. Other units continued moving to the south and eventually reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At about noon they were met by recce units from 30 Corp. At 4pm they made radio contact with the main force to the south and told them about the Son bridge, asking for a Bailey Bridge to be brought forward.

30 Corp soon arrived in Eindhoven, and by that night were camped out south of Son while they waited for the Royal Engineers to erect the new bridge. Thus ended Day 2, with the operation already 36 hours behind schedule.

Day 3, Tuesday the 19th

By this point most of the 1st was in place, and only the Polish brigade was yet to arrive in the 3rd lift later that day. Yet another attempt was made to reinforce Frost at the bridge, and this time resistance was even stronger. It appeared that there was no longer any hope of reaching the bridge, and the isolated units then retreated to set up strong lines to the west of the town, in Oosterbeek. Meanwhile at the bridge tanks were arriving to take up the fight, which was becoming desperate.

At 5pm a small part of the Polish units in the third lift finally arrived, but fell directly into the waiting guns of the Germans camped out arround the area – with the radios not working they still had no way to tell the HQ that the landing zone was taken and many of the Polish troops were killed. At the same time several of the supply drop points were also in German hands, and the 1st retrieved only 10% of the supplies dropped to them.

Things were going somewhat better for the 82nd, who found advanced units of 30 Corp arriving that morning. With the support of tanks they were able to quickly beat off the Germans in the area, at which point they decided to make a combined effort to take the bridge; the Guards Armored and 505th (part of the 82nd) would attack from the south while the 504th would cross the river in boats and take the north. The boats were called for to make the attempt in the late afternoon, but due to huge traffic problems to the south, they never arrived. Once again 30 Corp was held up in front of a bridge.

To their south the units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before found themselves facing a renewed attack that morning and gave ground. However as more British tanks arrived the Germans were beaten off by late afternoon. Later a small force of Panthers arrived at Son, seemingly out of nowhere, and started firing on the Bailey bridge. These too were beaten back by anti-tank guns that recently landed, and the bridge was secured.

Day 4, Wednesday the 20th

Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold out. Around noon the radios started working and they learned that the rest of the division had no hopes of relieving them, and that 30 Corp was stuck to their south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By the afternoon the Germans had complete control of the Arnhem bridge and started lighting fire to the houses the British were defending. The rest of the division had now set up defensive positions in Oosterbeek to the west of Arnhem, waiting for the arrival of 30 Corp.

In Nijmegen the boats still hadn't arrived during the night, so the troops continued to wait. They didn't arrive until the afternoon, but time was so short they decided to do the crossing in daylight. In what is generally considered to be one of the bravest actions in military history, they made the crossing in 26 rowboats into well defended positions. They took the banks and pressed to the bridge, which caused the Germans to pull back from their positions on the southern side. That freed the Guards Armored, who rushed across the bridge and met the airborne troops. Nijmegen bridge was now in Allied hands after four long days days.

Meanwhile the Germans organized another attack on the heights on the east side of town, this time making significant progess. Eventually the only remaining bridge suitable for tanks fell to the Germans, but was retaken by forces of the 82nd and Coldstream Guards.

To the south the running battles between the 101st and various German units continued, eventually with several Panthers once again rushing in and cutting off the roads, only leaving when they ran low on ammo.

Day 5, Thursday the 21th

Although hard pressed, things were looking up for Market/Garden this morning. 30 Corp was across the Nijmegen bridge and less than an hour's drive from the ongoing battle at the foot on Arnhem bridge. But it was too late, Frost's force was down to two houses, a handful of men, and had used up every bullet they had. With a last radio message "out of ammo, god save the king", his remaining force surrendered.

At the same time the rest of the Polish brigade, now two days late due to weather, arrived. The situation north of the river was obviously too hostile to land, so a new drop zone on the south side across from the 1st was selected. The landings went well, but the ferry they planned to use to reach the British had been sunk. Their force was largely wasted as a result.

Meanwhile the lead elements of Guards Armored sat still. Their commander refused to move them forward while Nijmegen to their south was still under constant threat, and radioed back along to the line for the 43rd infantry division to move up to take over the town. However by this point there was a 30 mile long traffic jam behind them, and the 43rd didn't arrive until the next day. But the GA were close enough by this point that they were in radio contact with the units in Oosterbeek, and starting shelling any German units who attempted to approach them.

German attacks continued all along the route, but by this point the Allied forces had clearly started to gain the upper hand. Not only were the Germans attacks stalled, the British and 101st continued to take more and more area.

Day 6, Friday the 22nd, Black Friday

The Poles continued to sit and watch the battle from the sidelines, with British artillery flying overhead from Nijmegen. That afternoon two British airborne soldiers swam the Rhine and informed them of the desperate situation, asking for any help they could give. The Poles were equipped only with inflatable rubber rafts, but promised to try a crossing that night. This operation was opposed, and only 52 soldiers made it across.

By this point much of the battle area was now in allied hands, and it appeared all of the problem was at the north end of the line with 30 Corp. However the Germans had other ideas, and during the previous night had organized two mixed armored divisions on either side of highway 69 at about the middle of the line north of Veghel (south of Grave). They attacked and only one side was stopped, while the other made it to the highway and cut the line. Any advance on Arnhem was now impossible.

Day 7, Saturday the 23rd

The Germans had figured out what the Poles were attempting and spent the rest of the day trying to cut the British off from the riverside. The British managed to hold on, and both sides suffered heavy losses. The Germans also attacked the Poles on the south side in order to tie them down, but several tanks arrived from 30 Corp and they were beaten off. Boats and engineers from the Canadian army arrived that day, and another river crossing that night landed another 150 troops.

To the south several more German attacks from their road crossing were stopped, but the road was still cut. 30 Corp then sent a unit of the Guards Armored south the 20km and re-took the road. The rest of the force to the north continued to wait for infantry to move up, still only a few kilometers from Arnhem.

Day 8, Sunday the 24th

Yet another German force attacked the road, this time to the south of Veghel. Several units were in the area, but were unable to stop them, and the Germans quickly set up defensive positions for the night.

It was not clear to the Allies at this point how much of a danger these actions represented. But it was on this day that the operation was essentially stopped and the decision made to go over to the defense. The 1st Airborne, or what remained of them, would be withdrawn that night. The lines would then be solidified where they were, with the new front line in Nijmegen.

Day 9, Monday the 25th

At 10pm the withdrawal of the remains of the 1st begins, as British and Canadian engineer units start ferrying the troops across the Rhine. By early the next morning they had withdrawn some 2000 of them, but another 300 were still on the north at first light when German fire stopped the effort. They surrendered. Of the 10,000 troops of the 1st Airborne Division, only 2,000 escaped.

To the south the newly-arrived 50th Infantry attacked the Germans holding the highway. By the next day they had been surrounded and their resistance ended. The corridor was now secure, but with nowhere to go.

Conclusions

It's always easy to second-guess a battle, and it's likely the case that this is even more true of Market/Garden than any other battle in modern history.

One certain problem with the plan was that the entire operation required both bridges over the Rhine to be captured and held. Had the Nijmegen bridge been destroyed or remained in German hands, the British would be cut off kilometers to the north with no hope whatsoever. Even with Nijmegen successfully taken, things would be little better if Arnhem bridge fell. This would require a forced crossing of the Rhine to relieve the airborne, and there was no planning to allow for this very possible eventuality.

Given this, it's astounding in retrospect that the plans placed so little effort on capturing the important bridges immediately with forces dropped right on them. In the case of Veghel and Grave, where this was done, the bridges were captured with only a few shots being fired. There seems little reason to suspect the same wouldn't have been true of Arnhem and Nijmegen, but with the troops over an hour's march away, or told to to other things, there was little hope of their success.

This is even more confusing when you consider the 1st para-landing troops. They were to land along with the glider-landing forces to secure the drop zone. This makes little sense considering that it was up to the glider forces to hold the zone, and the paratroops were going to pick up and walk off emmediately anyway. There's simply no reason they couldn't have been dropped right on the south side of the bridge.

Just as baffling is the end-game actions on the part of 30 Corp. Although Frost's force was likely lost under any circumstance, Arnhem was not the only available bridge. At a minimum had they pushed north they would have arrived at the south end and secured it, leaving the way open for another crossing to the north at some other point. There was the smaller possibility of arriving with Frost's force intact. This "lack of guts" on the part of the GA is odd.

The commander of 30 Corp asked for another course of action. About 25km to the west of the action was another bridge similar to Arnhem, at Rhenen, which he predicted was undefended due to all efforts being directed on Oosterbeek. In fact this was the case, and had the GA dashed over, it is almost certain they would have crossed unopposed and fell onto the rear of the German lines on the west of Oosterbeek. However by this time it appears Montgomery was spooked by the continued resistance of the German forces and refused to take the chance.

In the end Montgomery still called Market Garden 90% successful and said:

The story of Operation Market Garden is, among others, told in the Cornelius Ryan novel A Bridge Too Far and its subsequent film adaptation by Richard Attenborough.

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The British Plan

Beginning on December 16, 1944, the German forces attacked through the Ardennes Forest in Belgium. The German plan for the "von Rundstedt Offensive" was to split the Allied advance and then cut nortwards to seize Antwerp. The territory was heavily forested and mountainous, there appeared little chance of an armoured assault in this sector. The battle started in very poor weather, this grounded Allied aircraft and greatly aided the German advance.

The first few days were vital, and although many American troops were over-run or surrendered, unexpectedly strong resistance in certain areas greatly slowed the German advance.

On December 21 the German forces had completely surrounded Bastogne, defended by the 101st Airborne Division. When General Anthony McAuliffe was awakened by a German invitation to surrender, he gave a one-syllable reply that has been variously reported and was probably unprintable. However, there is no disagreement as to what he wrote on the paper delivered to the Germans: "NUTS!" That reply had to be explained both to the Germans and to non-American Allies.

By December 24 the German advance was effectively stalled short of the Meuse River, they had outrun their supply lines, and shortages of fuel and ammunition were becoming critical. Improving weather brought the massive Allied air superiority back into play. The Germans retreated from Bastogne on January 13.

The battle officially ended on January 27, 1945.

The German losses were critical in reducing the length of the war, vital and irreplaceable men and equipment had been wasted in a few weeks.

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The Battle of Britain began on August 1940. After the French collapsed under the Blitzkrieg and surrendered in June, the Germans were not exactly sure what to do next. Adolf Hitler (and the German people) believed the war was over and the Britons would come to terms very soon. Patriotic myth states that stubborn as they are, Albion refused to give in. In reality there was a considerable section of the public and politicians who believed it was time to negotiate with Hitler. Winston Churchill, however, was the master of the Cabinet and would not countenance peace, putting Lord Halifax (one of the pro-peace members of the Cabinet) on the air to reject Hitler's terms.

More direct measures were thought of, but it was not until July that an invasion plan was prepared by the OKW (Armed Forces High Command). The operation, code-named Seelöwe (Sea-Lion), planned for an invasion sometime in mid-September. The plan called for landings in the Dover area, first with two airborne divisions, and then with another nine delivered by sea. All preparations were supposed to be made by mid-June to late-August.

Much of the plan relied on makeshift solutions, including the use of river barges as troop transports, and using discarded aircraft engines for motorizing them. Others were better thought out, like swimming tanks or using snorkels on the heavier tanks so they could be landed further out on sea and march to land on the seabed.

Hindsight suggests that the entire operation was not seriously planned with actual execution in mind, especially when compared to the careful planning of Operation Barbarossa. Regardless it was patently impossible to prepare for the in two months. Indeed Churchill did not take the invasion threat seriously, sending troops to Africa in the summer of 1940, but he was concerned over the potential air threat and energetic in securing resources for the RAF.

But before Seelöwe could begin the Luftwaffe had to destroy the British RAF -- otherwise the ships for the sea invasion would have been destroyed by British aircraft. Thus a plan was hatched to directly attack the RAF airfields and aircraft production centers, Göring called his plans Adlerangriff (Eagle Attack), beginning on August 11 with Adlertag (Eagle Day). But even before this there was to be a month of attacks on Channel convoys and the RAF out over the water. This period of fighting was called Kanalkampf by the Germans.

The British were fully aware of the German goals, strategy, and often even tactics due to their ability to read the German Enigma cypher, which was used for most high-security German military radio communications. This fact, not revealed until the 1970s, was crucial in forming British tactics. They had also killed or turned all German agents in Britain.

The Germans didn't keep using any single strategy, even when it was on the verge of defeating the RAF largely because they didn't have any real idea of its success, but also because Hitler's style encouraged competing interests in the High Command to try their pet theories in tactics.

The Battle can be crudely divided into four sections:

• July - August 11: Kanalkampf
• August 12 - August 24: Adlerangriff
• August 25 - September 6: German's attack RAF planes and airfields almost exclusively. The critical period of the battle
• September 7 onwards: London and other major cities are bombed.

Adlertag began with the Luftwaffe bombing ports, airfields, aircraft industries, radar installations, etc. Over the course of the next weeks, they flew 12,039 sorties and dropped over 11,000 tons of high explosive bombs and over 616 tons of incendiary bombs.

At first, the main targets for the German Luftwaffe were radar installations and airports, in an attempt to destroy (either on the ground, or in the air defending the ground targets) or render useless the British fighter planes.

The attacks against the radar installations were not seen as very successful, and appears that Göring continued to underestimate the value of the radar to the RAF, and so eventually called off attacks on the stations. In fact the radar was absolutely vital to the RAF and the attacks were generally succeeding -- a fact the RAF masked with a successful deception campaign. Attacks on the airbases and factories were also successful, but it was largely impossible for the Luftwaffe to assess the damage on these inland targets.

Thanks to radar and the intelligence from the decoded Enigma messages the RAF reacted very effectively to the German raids. Hugh Dowding's communications and infrastructure linking radar and other information sources to the decision makers was arguably as important as radar. Rather than sending up large numbers of fighters to meet German raids (and thus running the risk of of having all the planes on the ground for refuelling and repairs when another raid arrives), British commanders (such as Keith Park of 11 Group) ordered that only a very few fighters up to meet each raid, harassing the German bombers enough to make accurate bombing very difficult and causing far more British losses than German.

Despite the success of Dowding's measured response, soon after the Battle of Britain some proponents of the Big Wing theory would complain that large numbers of RAF fighters should have been gathered together to strike German attacks with greater force. Because the reasons behind their strategy, the Enigma decrypts, were still secret, Dowding and Park could not defend their actions as they needed to, and were given much lower positions, Keith Park eventually climbing back to lead Malta's air strategy.

Both sides suffered horribly, but British pilot losses were smaller since most of the fights were fought over British soil, whereas every German crew that had to bail out was lost to the German war effort. Also J.M. Mitchell had designed the Spitfire with a lot of thought for pilot safety when attacked.

Thanks to the seemingly endless numbers of planes the Germans had at their disposal, the Fighter Command began to lose this battle of attrition. This remained largely unknown to the Luftwaffe, which was growing desperate to deliver on the original timetable. What they could see is that for some reason the RAF always had at least a small number of planes to attack with, no matter how many times they sent in a raids. Something needed to be done to force the RAF to commit all of their planes -- or so they thought.

One thing that was sure to force their hand would be to attack a large, very public target. That target was London. The first such raid on 7th of September was intended as revenge for the British attack on Berlin on 25th/26th August, which in turn was a response to a German bomber accidentally dropping bombs on London. Although the docks of London were the main target attacked, the British suffered 448 dead and more than 1,300 wounded.

Together with the change of targets came a change in strategy. The success in the Battle of Britain was no longer seen as prerequisite for Seelöwe, but was meant to be decisive in itself. Goering believed that the British would surrender as soon as the RAF was beaten.

On 16th of September the Germans estimated British fighter strength to be no more than 300 planes, when they actually had 572 Spitfires and Hurricanes. What was even less clear was that switching off of the airfields would allow the RAF to work on their aircraft and allow their pilots rest.

But without a doubt the most damaging aspect of the switch to London was the ranges involved. By the time the German fighters arrived over the city, they were already so low on fuel as to have to turn home. This left all too many raids completely undefended as their fighters turned for home after minor combat on the way to target.

The result was a series of disastrous raids. On September 19th Operation Seelöwe was postponed indefinitely. But the battle of Britain was not over. From October 1940 until the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, almost 40,000 additional sorties were flown and more than 38,000 tons of high explosive bombs and more than 3,500 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped. Between August and September the RAF stated German losses at 1600 aircraft destroyed and over 500 probables, however despite most of the fighting occurring over land only 315 wrecks were identified. British Fighter Command lost between 900 and 1900 Hurricanes and Spitfires (depending on which figures you care to believe).

Overall the Battle of Britain was a British victory, although on a small scale compared to later battles it was significant, especially in increasing American anti-Nazi opinion. Although the Germans came very close to beating the RAF and thus setting the prerequisites for Seelöwe, the switch to terror strategy allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. The terror strategy in itself could not force the British to surrender. Even though the Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, they could not destroy the British industrial potential.

Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were 23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded.

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• "For us the Hurtgen was one of the most costly, most unproductive, and most ill-advised battles that our army has ever fought." --Gen. James Gavin, Commander, 82nd Airborne Division, 1944-1945



• "The German Command could not understand the reason for the strong American attacks in the Hurtgen Forest...the fighting in the wooded area denied the American troops the advantages offered them by their air and armored forces, the superiority of which had been decisive in all the battles waged before." -- Generalmajor von Gersdorff, Chief of Staff, German 7th Army, 1944-1945



• "The forest up there was a helluva eerie place to fight...Show me a man who went through the battle...and who says he never had a feeling of fear, and I'll show you a liar. You can't get all of the dead because you can't find them, and they stay there to remind the guys advancing as to what might hit them. You can't get protection. You can't see...Artillery slashes the trees like a scythe. Everything is tangled. You can scarcely walk. Everybody is cold and wet, and the mixture of cold rain and sleet keeps falling. Then they jump off again, and soon there is only a handful of old men left." --T.Sgt. George Morgan, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry

“Preparation for the invasion of the Philippines was greatly assisted by ULTRA, the Allied top secret interception, decryption, and dissemination program against Japanese radio traffic.”

“The campaign for Leyte cost American forces a total of 15,584 casualties, of which 3,504 were killed in action. In their failed defense of Leyte, the Japanese lost an estimated 49,000 troops, most of them combat forces. Although General Yamashita still had some 250,000 troops on Luzon, the additional loss of air and naval support at Leyte so narrowed his options that he now had to fight a defensive, almost passive, battle of attrition on Luzon, clearly the largest and most important island in the Philippines. In effect, once the decisive battle of Leyte was lost, the Japanese themselves gave up all hope of retaining the Philippines, conceding to the Allies in the process a critical bastion from which Japan could be easily cut off from her resources in the East Indies and from which the final assaults on the Japanese home islands could be launched.”

“The campaign for Leyte proved the first and most decisive operation in the American reconquest of the Philippines. The Japanese invested heavily in Leyte, and lost. The campaign cost their army four divisions and several separate combat units, while the navy lost twenty-six major warships, and forty-six large transports and merchantmen. The struggle also reduced Japanese land-based air capability in the Philippines by more than 50 percent, forcing them to depend on suicidal kamikaze pilots.”

“In the end the Japanese decision to stake everything on the battle for Leyte only hastened their final collapse as they lacked the ability to coordinate the mass of air, ground and naval forces that they committed to the struggle. Even before the fighting on Leyte ended, MacArthur's forces had moved on to invade Luzon and the rest of the Philippines, thereby consolidating their hold on this former Japanese bastion and completing a final major step toward Japan itself.”

Note: Quotes for The Battle of Leyte are taken from CMH (Center for Military History) Online

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The casualty figures were extremely high and are reflected in the length of time (nearly 6 months, from early April 1945 until September 1945) which it took to take the island and obtain a surrender from the Japanese forces.

“The price paid for Okinawa was dear. The final toll of American casualties was the highest experienced in any campaign against the Japanese. Total American battle casualties were 49,151, of which 12,520 were killed or missing and 36,631 wounded. Army losses were 4,582 killed, 93 missing, and 18,ogg wounded; Marine losses, including those of the Tactical Air Force, were 2,938 killed and missing and 13,708 wounded; Navy casualties totaled 4,907 killed and missing and 4,824 wounded. Nonbattle casualties during the campaign amounted to 15,613 for the Army and 10,598 for the Marines. The losses in ships were 36 sunk and 368 damaged, most of them as a result of air action. Losses in the air were 763 planes from 1 April to 1 July.”

“The high cost of the victory was due to the fact that the battle had been fought against a capably led Japanese army of greater strength than anticipated, over difficult terrain heavily and expertly fortified, and thousands of miles from home. The campaign had lasted considerably longer than was expected. But Americans had demonstrated again on Okinawa that they could, ultimately, wrest from the Japanese whatever ground they wanted. ”

“The cost of the battle to the Japanese was even higher than to the Americans. Approximately 110,000 of the enemy lost their lives in the attempt to hold Okinawa, and 7,400 more were taken prisoners. The enemy lost 7,800 airplanes, 16 ships sunk, and 4 ships damaged. More important, the Japanese lost 640 square miles of territory within 350 miles of Kyushu.”

“The military value of Okinawa exceeded all hope. It was sufficiently large to mount great numbers of troops; it provided numerous airfield sites close to the enemy's homeland; and it furnished fleet anchorage helping the Navy to keep in action at Japan's doors. As soon as the fighting ended, American forces on Okinawa set themselves to preparing for the battles on the main islands of Japan, their thoughts sober as they remembered the bitter bloodshed behind and also envisioned an even more desperate struggle to come.”

“The sequel to Okinawa, however, was contrary to all expectation. In the midst of feverish preparations on the island in August 1945, with the day for the assault on Kyushu drawing near, there came the almost unbelievable and joyous news that the war was over. The battle of Okinawa was the last of World War II.”

Note: Quotes for The Battle of Okinawa are taken from CMH (Center for Military History) Online

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On July 7 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the bridge. Despite determined resistance by KMT forces, Japanese army managed to take the bridge and eventually Beijing which was abandoned by KMT.

Historical significance

The battle officially marked Japanese large scale invasion of China, and is often considered to be the start of the second Sino-Japanese War. With the Japanese victory its Imperial Army could move on to the North China Plain (north of Huang he) without much resistance since their tanks were formidable against the low-tech Chinese armies (KMT and CCP).

Prelude to Battle

After the Incident of September 18 in 1931, Japan had occupied Manchuria and had created an nominally independent state of Manchukuo with Ai-xin-jue-luo Pu-yi (the last emperor of China) as its sovereign. That state is widely regarded to have been a puppet government with real power concentrated in the hands of the Japanese, which constituted the only significant military forces in Manchuria. Although the Kuomintang and the international community refused to recognize the legality of the Japanese occupation, a truce had been negotiated in 1931.

At the end of 1932, Japanese Guandong Army invaded Chahaer Province. (KMT's 29th Army, lead by General Song Zhe Yuan and armed only with spears and obsolete rifles, resisted the aggression, resulting in the War of Resistance at the Great Wall. The province fell to the Japanese after the predictable victory therefore areas to the west of Beijing fell to the Japanese.

In 1933, Japan annexed Rehe Province using the security of Manzhouguo as a pretext. Consequently all areas north of the Great wall and hence north of Beijing fell to Japan. In 1935, Japan annexed eastern portion of Hebei Province, established yet another puppet government, Eastern Ji Anticommunist Automated Government. Later that year, Ho Ying Qin and Umemura mirou signed an agreement, known as the Ho-Umemura Agreement by which the Japanese could deploy troops around Beijing at will. As a result at the start of 1937, Beijing was surrounded at north, west and east by areas occupied by Japanese.

Japanese installations of various puppet governments were deliberate attempts to annex whole country of China by nibbling. The puppet government at Nanjing with Wang Jingwei as head was another obvious example.

Geography around the bridge and Beijing

Beijing locates on the Yen Mountain which is the only highlands north of the North China Plain.

Lugou Bridge locates in Fengtai, a suburb area south of Beijing. It is also known as the Marco Polo Bridge because the bridge was believed to be described in the works of Marco Polo.)

4 strategic posts secured Beijing from outside the city.

East of the city: Tongzhou Town Northwest: Nankou Town at Changping Prefecture South: Fengtai Town Southwest: Lugou Bridge at Wanping Prefecture where Wanping Town was located. The bridge was the choke-point of Pinghan Railway (Beijing-Wuhan Railway) and guarded the only passage leading Beijing to KMT-controlled area from the south. Nanwan Town located between Wanping town and Beijing.

Before the start of the battle, all the first 3 posts were under Japanese control except the southwest. The west end of the bridge was controlled by the Japanese as the east by KMT. If the bridge fell, the city will be completely cut off and easily captured.

Strategic Appraisal

China: At this time of the war, the Chinese armies (KMT and CCP) were mostly infantry equipped with rifles, spears and sabres. Some soldiers were recruited from peasants and local gangsters, thus well under trained and equipped compared to the Japanese Imperial Army. Outnumbering the enemy and exploiting the battlefield landscape to their advantages had been their only ways to defeat the enemy.

Japan: Subduing the cities guaranteed the fall of the north of Huang he portion of the North China Plain since the Japanese mechanised divisions were formidable against the Chinese armies which had virtually no aircrafts and any anti-tank weaponry.

The 29th Army, composed mostly of Feng yu xiang's forces and infantry, secured the cities of Beijing and Tianjin and the Hebei Province.

The Japanese Guandong Army at the region was a combination of infantry, tanks, mechanized forces, artilleries and cavalries.

Phase II

KMT forces

same as Phase I except 132th was moved to garrison Nanwan Town which is between Wanping Town and Beijing.

Japanese Forces

3th Division of Guandong Army from Chahaer Province and 15(9?)th Division from Manchuria and troops from Phase I were all commanded by General Hashimoto. Strength of Japanese Army sharply increased from around 1000 to around 3000. 34th(?) Army of Guandong army was on its way from Manchuria and Korea.

Course of the Battle

Phase I

Beginning late June 1937, the Japanese army (several hundreds) deployed at the west end of the bridge was practising while Kuomintang forces, garrisoned in Wanping Town, watched closely. At dawn of July 7, the Japanese army telegraphed the KMT forces saying that a soldier was missing and believed to be hiding inside the town. The Japanese demanded that its army should enter the town to search for the missing soldier, who was later found unharmed. There are some disputes among historians over the incident with some historians believing that this was an unintentional accident while others believing that the entire incident was fabricated by the Kwantung Army in order to provide a pretext for the invasion of central China.

Colonel Ji denied the request backed by his superior, General Song. In the evening of July 7, Matsui gave Ji an ultimatum that KMT troops must let Japanese troops enter the town within the next hour or the town will be fired. Nevertheless Japanese artillery had already aimed at the town when the ultimatum was sent. At midnight July 8, Japanese artillery units started bombarding the town while the infantry with tanks matched across the bridge at dawn. With order from Song, Ji led the KMT forces of about 1000 to defend at all cost. The Japanese army partially overran the bridge and vicinity in the afternoon. KMT force, after reinforcement by nearby units, outnumbered the Japanese and retook it completely next day. Japanese army then halted the attack and offered negotiation, marking the end of Phase I. Nevertheless Japanese army still concentrated at the west end of the bridge.

Phase II

During the meeting of all senior (KMT officers in Beijing on July 12, Qin insisted that KMT forces must remain defending and resisted any temptation of negotiating with the Japanese whom he did not trust. Zhang in turn argued the incident on July 7 could still be settled by negotiation. Song then sent Zhang as KMT representative to Tianjin to meet General Hashimoto, the commander of all Japanese forces around the cities of Beijing and Tianjin and in Chahaer and Rehe Provinces.

At the beginning Hashimoto told Zhang that the Japanese hoped the incident on July 7 to be settled peacefully. Zhang was encouraged by his friendly gesture and telegraphed Song that any increasedKMT forces concentration around Beijing would be viewed as an escalation and angered the Japanese. However Song thought Hashimoto was only buying time since he received various reconnaissance reports indicating increasing accumulation of Japanese forces from Manchuria and Korea around Beijing. As the recent Chinese victory relied on outnumbering the opponent, he transferred Zhao's 132th accompanied with Qin to station at Nanwan Town which was between the bridge and Beijing to keep up the pressure from concentration of Japanese forces. Similar to most KMT and CCP, 29th Army was under equipped with only rifles with respect to better armed, trained and commanded Japanese troops whose tanks the Chinese armies stiil did not have any weapon (like mortars) capable of destroying them.

On July 31 (end of the month), Japanese promised not to invade Beijing and Tianjin upon agreement of all following terms:

1) KMT must wipe out all anti-Japanese organizations and halt all anti-Japanese activities inside the cities.
2) KMT must take all responsibilities of the incident on July 7.
3) Song, not any other inferior personnel of 29th Army, must apologize.

Zhang accepted the first term and the commander of the battalion under Ji's command will be relieved as an agreement to the second. However Zhang told Hashimoto that he could not decide on behalf of Song, thus cannot agree on the third term at the time. He then returned to Beijing. Hashimoto also hinted that the Japanese would prefer Zhang as the commander of KMT troops around the city. As soon as Zhang's departure, the Japanese launched full scale attack on Beijing.

On August 10, three days after Zhang heading for the city, the bridge and Wanping Town fell to the Japanese. Nanwan Town fell on next day with both divisions (37th and 132th) shattered. Zhao was mortally wounded on battlefield and Qin retreated with the remnants back to the city. In the evening after the fall of Nanwan Town, Zhang finally arrived (He had to pass through enemy lines to reach the city.). Several days after, Song relieved himself of all non-military posts and appointed Zhang to take his posts and Mayor of Beijing. Qin and Song then led 29th Army out of the city which was going to be encircled within hours and left Zhang with virtually no troops. Japanese armies enter the city on August 18 without much resistance and installed Zhang as mayor. However Zhang thought he was betrayed and left the city secretly a week later.

Aftermath

With the fall of Beijing on August 18 and Tianjin on 21st, the North Chain Plain was helpless against Japanese mechanized divisions who occupied it by the end of the year. Chinese armies (KMT and CCP) were on constant retreat until the hard fought Chinese victory at Tai er zhuang.

There are some disputes among historians over KMT handling of Japanese troops approaching Beijing with some historians believing that Zhang and Song intentionally cooperate secretly with Zhang appointment of non-military posts in Beijing. Song and Qin can then safely retreat from the city to keep the fighting ability of 29th Army. Others believed that the Japanese completely sold Zhang out as the Japanese still invaded the cities even though KMG agreed all terms. Zhang was vilified relentlessly by the Chinese media, some of which (like the Shanghai Daily) reviled him as the traitor of the country. Upon arrival at Nanjing he apologized publicly. Since he later died fighting against the Japanese, Zhang was pardoned for his activities in Beijing by KMT

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